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Abstract: The paper presents the contemporary information policy implemented by 
the Ukrainian government. The survey answers the question about the new role of in-
formation policy in the state authorities’ activities. The research focuses on the execu-
tive branch of power, due to its impact on the internal and external image of Ukraine. 
The analysis was conducted at the strategic, institutional and operational levels, and 
concerned the content of messages.
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Introduction
The ‘Revolution of Dignity’ which took place in Independence Square in Kiev from November 2013 to February 2014 significantly influ-
enced the perception of Ukraine in the international arena. The organizers 
of the protests in Kiev won fame and the acclaim of the international com-
munity for effective communication mainly through social and content 
media. On the one hand, the choice of communication channels stemmed 
from the specific nature of the Ukrainian media market, and on the other 
hand it was mainly determined by the technical reach of the new media. 
The leaders of the protests and their organizers communicated with the 
recipients in a deliberate and coordinated way. Roscigno and Danaher 
emphasize the importance of content disseminated on networks during 
protests (Roscigno, Danaher, 2001). Activists (protest leaders) want to 
influence public opinion, so they engage users in creating news in such 
a way that the stories told reach the hearts of the interested people (Ju-
ris, 2005; Mutz, Young, 2011; Seib, 2012, p. 145; Turcotte, York, Irving, 
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Scholl, Pingree, 2015). The communication from participants of events 
in Independence Square was organic in its nature (Piechota, Rajczyk, 
2015; Hubenko, Wall, 2018). Limitations in using traditional media, es-
pecially television, playing an important role in building the Ukrainian 
information space, resulted mainly from the ownership structure of the 
TV broadcasters. State TV channels were subordinated to the govern-
ment, as were those owned by the Ukrainian oligarchs supporting it. As 
Gemma Edwards remarks, new media influence the process of mobiliza-
tion of individuals who use their smartphones to publish films on content 
websites and to comment on events in social media, contributing to the 
development of independent media (Edwards, 2014, p. 63). The use of 
Internet channels in mass communication during the protests was impor-
tant. Castells emphasizes the growing role of network communication 
during protests, pointing to its existence outside of state control, in real 
time, in a way increasing interactivity and personalization of the message 
(Castells, 2006, p. 211; Gil de Zuniga, Puig-i-Abril, Rojas, 2009; Castells, 
2013, pp. 212–219; Weeks, Holbert, 2013). The Internet during protests 
was a communication platform ensuring a technical reach comparable 
only with global TV information channels. They used and duplicated con-
tent published in social media, both by the main leaders of the Revolution 
of Dignity and other participants of the events in Kiev. Using content me-
dia, the global media created their own content, publishing highly cred-
ible messages. The lack of a political manager of messages, and also us-
ing modern forms of journalism that are attractive for the viewer, such as 
live video reports, ensured a significant social reach for two Internet TV 
channels: hromadske.tv and espresso.tv. (Rajczyk, 2016, pp. 109–110.) 
The social reach built as a result of live reporting of the events on Maidan 
square enabled the channel hromadske.tv to become one of the terrestrial 
TV operators after the events at the Euromaidan. In the Ukrainian situa-
tion of digital exclusion, this also entails the commercial success of the 
enterprise.
Communication during the events on Kiev’s Maidan served an in-
formative function, and the function of aggregating social capital. It was 
used both to gain political and material support for the protesters. Both 
functions were characterized by coherence of message and unity of objec-
tives. As Reznik (2016) claims, this was shown in a consistent, pro-Eu-
ropean narration based on the criticism of the refusal by President Viktor 
Yanukovych to sign the association agreement between Ukraine and the 
European Union, and then consistent, anti-system rhetoric stemming 
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from the message, emphasizing anti-corruption issues and the necessity 
of systemic changes.1
The change in the Ukrainian government brought about a change of 
both the methods and objectives of the government’s information policy. 
In the first phase, that ended on May 25, 2014 with the snap presidential 
elections, the information policy should be treated as a tool enabling the 
consolidation of external and internal political support for the temporary 
state authorities. However, a turning point in these communication activi-
ties was the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the com-
mencement of the counter-terrorism operations in Luhansk and Donetsk 
oblasts, connected with the proclamation of the Luhansk and Donetsk 
People’s Republics. The conflict of information around the annexation of 
Crimea in all its stages (occupation of the peninsula by the so-called ‘lit-
tle green men,’ the ‘independence’ referendum and incorporation to the 
Russian Federation) has demonstrated the information supremacy of the 
Russian side. Public support for the annexation of Crimea both in the pe-
ninsula itself and in Russia resulted mostly from the systemic character of 
Russian propagandist influence and propaganda intoxication of the ethnic 
Russians dominating in the social structure of Crimea.
This systemic nature of propagandist influence encompasses all 
spheres of social life, its principles are complementary to each other and 
correlated with the system of traditional cultural values. It uses elements 
of social engineering, e.g. in the form of universal propagandist clichés 
– mainly the ethos of fighting fascism and victory in World War II. The 
condition necessary for propaganda intoxication to be effective is also its 
coherence with the values held by the recipient and their view of the world, 
shaped as a result of propagandist influence. Economic and ethnic factors 
also become important in such a case. The strong national identification 
of a significant part of Crimean residents, combined with the national 
lability of the inhabitants of the eastern oblasts of Ukraine, influenced the 
effectiveness of the political and communicative influence of the Russian 
side.2 However, it should be emphasized that Ukrainian activities in the 
1 Examples of anti-corruption issues include: the presentation of members of the 
government formed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk to protesters in Maidan or creating a spe-
cial anti-corruption office headed by one of the leaders of protests in Independence 
Square.
2 For more on this issue see: Regarding	The	Information	–	Psychological	Compo-
nent	of	Aggression	of	The	Russian	Federation	Against	Ukraine, http://en.niss.gov.ua/
public/File/englishpublic/Russia_aggression.pdf, Nov. 13, 2017.
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information war over Donbas against Russia have changed significantly 
since the unilateral declaration of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s 
Republic, mainly in the strategic and institutional aspect, but also on the 
operational level, being included in the issues of information security.
Research methodology
The study was carried out on the basis of a quantitative analysis of the 
content of strategic documents, legislation and gazettes issued by gov-
ernment bodies with a particular focus on the Ministry of Information 
Policy of Ukraine. The analysis encompassed documents issued from 
January 14, 2015, when under the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine the Ministry of Information Policy was created. The assess-
ment of the effectiveness of Ukrainian information policy is based mainly 
on the correlation between strategic objectives and their implementation 
in communication practice. Such an analysis takes into consideration the 
strategic, institutional and operational aspects. To this end, a main re-
search hypothesis was adopted which assumes that Ukraine’s information 
policy is a function of information security, and the specific hypothesis 
emphasizing the secondary role of information policy compared with the 
strategic communication of the state. The following research questions 
were used for problem analysis: (1) what factors determine Ukrainian in-
formation policy? and (2) how is Ukrainian information policy connected 
with the strategic communications of the Ukrainian state?
The two-year research perspective is not wide, but it does allow us 
to formulate conclusions and make a possible evaluation. The choice of 
the period for the purposes of the analysis was dictated by the institu-
tionalization of information policy and reorientation of strategic com-
munications of the Ukrainian state caused by the geopolitical changes 
which are an effect of the Revolution of Dignity and new phenomena 
triggered by it in the communication sphere. In the strict sense, this 
mainly concerns the impact of the ideological and narrative propagan-
dist media, while in the broad sense it is about the information security 
of the state (Rajczyk, 2016, p. 75). In the research process, the number 
of users of content published on selected information channels in social 
and content media was also counted. This made it possible to reveal 
the structural effectiveness of the information policy carried out in its 
utilitarian context.
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The analysis of research problems should be preceded by a review of 
definitions. The topic of this article requires the precise definition of the 
notion of information policy. According to Renata Maćkowska, informa-
tion policy is “undertaking information activities” (Maćkowska, 2010, p. 
141). However, considering the specific character of the research issues 
tackled in this article, the wider context of information influence should 
be indicated. In the narrow sense, information policy as described above is 
the topic of analysis here. From a broader perspective, though, the whole 
process of public communication should also be taken into considera-
tion. According to Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, such communication is 
a process formally occurring “in a certain communication (information) 
space aimed at providing and exchanging information for public use and 
maintaining social relations by the public institutions responsible for this 
process” (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006, p. 122).
The specific nature of the information policy carried out by Ukrainian 
state authorities encourages presenting it in the context of strategic com-
munication, which is defined as “concentrated processes and efforts un-
dertaken in order to understand and engage key audiences (recipients) to 
create, enhance or preserve conditions favorable for promoting national 
interests and objectives by using coordinated information, topics, plans, 
programs and activities synchronized with undertakings carried out by 
other elements of state authorities” (Kacała, Lipińska, 2017, p. 25) The 
US State Department includes the following issues in strategic communi-
cation: information operations, public diplomacy, international radio and 
TV broadcasting as well as public affairs – information and press activi-
ties (Kacała, Lipińska, 2017, p. 26).
The above typology has been applied for the purposes of this article, 
but with the exclusion of public diplomacy. This exclusion is due to the ap-
proach to the subject made on the basis of the definition proposed by Beata 
Ociepka, defining this type of diplomacy as “a bilateral, dialogic form of 
political international communication, targeted at the public abroad, im-
plemented thanks to mass media and through direct channels. Its aim is to 
shape or enhance a positive image of a country and society abroad, shaping 
positive attitudes towards the sender” (Ociepka, 2008, p. 12). However, 
Ociepka emphasizes that public diplomacy is “one of the most effective 
instruments of international positioning of the state by using its soft re-
sources. It is thus an instrument consciously applied by states in order to 
make their soft power resources recognized (the internal dimension of pub-
lic diplomacy) and then used in foreign policy” (Ociepka, 2013, p. 70). 
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According to this definition, public diplomacy is an instrument for imple-
menting the foreign policy of a state, and by using so-called soft power it 
serves the purpose of shaping the external image of a country. The creator 
of the soft power concept – J. S. Nye (2007), states that for a given coun-
try the most important thing is the “policy of attracting others.” This is 
achieved not only through offering a good product but also through promo-
tional campaigns. This concerns, among other things, cultural diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy should thus be clearly differentiated from information 
policy, despite the fact that, undoubtedly, in a wider sense, these are also 
communication activities, clearly persuasive in their nature. The role of the 
media in creating the image of a country leads to a situation where media 
organizations are treated as symbolic elites that are needed to participate 
in the transmission of the image (Eisenstadt, Giesen, 1995). They not only 
make the selection of the image, but first of all communicate it to groups of 
recipients.3 According to Krzyżanowski (2008), they also hold temporary 
power over the discourse that is taking place.
To sum up the outline of definition issues, it is worth pointing out 
that the subject of this analysis is the different dimensions of information 
policy understood in its narrow sense as information activities, including 
information operations, international TV and radio broadcasting as well 
as information and press activities.
An original concept including information policy in strategic com-
munication is proposed by the Information	Security	Doctrine	of	Ukraine 
– a document defining the national interests, directions and priorities of 
the state in the communication sphere, and its threats. It also treats the 
said information policy as part of the strategic communication of the 
Ukrainian state, which is defined as the coordinated application of com-
munication potential to promote state interests.4
It is also worth focusing attention on the notion of information secu-
rity. This term does not have an unambiguous definition. In the litera-
3 A. Buhmann and D. Ingenhoff (2015, p. 102) present a similar opinion: “Re-
search shows that the image of a country, as the cognitive representation that a person 
holds about a given country has a wide range of effects: country images critically 
influence foreign direct investment, the prosperity of national tourist industries, the 
attractiveness of domestic labor markets and educational systems as well as the stabil-
ity of international relations and the degree of a country’s political influence in the 
international system.”
4 Cf.: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 25 lyutoho 2017 roku No. 47/2017 Pro	
Doktrynu	 informatsiynoyi	 bezpeky	 Ukrayiny, http://www.president.gov.ua/docu-
ments/472017-21374, Nov. 6, 2017.
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ture on the subject, we can find approaches to information security as 
“an element of an IT system synonymous to computer, telecommunica-
tion and network security” (Więcaszek-Kuczyńska, 2014, p. 212). Lidia 
Więcaszek-Kuczyńska is quoting a definition by Eugeniusz Nowak and 
Maciej Nowak, which is important from the point of view of the subject 
matter of this article approaching information security as “the state of 
external and internal conditions allowing a country to freely develop its 
information society.” Due to the topic of this article, information security 
will be interpreted according to Eugeniusz Nowak and Maciej Nowak’s 
definition (Więcaszek-Kuczyńska, 2014, p. 213).
Strategic dimension of information policy
Information security as a separate category appears first of all in the 
Ukrainian Constitution, listed alongside the protection of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.5 Article 17 of Ukrainian fundamental law points to the 
necessity of ensuring information security as one of the most important 
functions of the state, alongside economic security, protection of sover-
eignty and territorial integrity. However, it should be emphasized that in the 
quoted article the Ukrainian Constitution gives responsibility for security 
issues to the Armed Forces and government bodies safeguarding the state.
Undoubtedly, even the preparation of the Information	Security	Doc-
trine	 of	Ukraine is an implementation of the constitutional guarantees 
stemming from Article 17. In the narrow aspect, this doctrine is an answer 
to the Russian incursion into Ukrainian information space, since the aim 
of the document is the formulation of the principles of implementation of 
state information policy, which first of all is to counteract the destructive 
information influence of the Russian Federation in the conditions of the 
hybrid war being fought by it.6 The Doctrine as a strategic document is 
5 KONSTYTUTSIYA	UKRAYINY (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayiny (VVR), 
1996, No. 30, st. 141) [Iz zminamy, vnesenymy zhidno iz Zakonamy No. 2222-IV 
vid 08.12.2004, VVR, 2005, No. 2, st. 44; No. 2952-VI vid 01.02.2011, VVR, 2011, 
No. 10, st. 68; No. 586-VII vid 19.09.2013, VVR, 2014, No. 11, st. 142; No. 742-
VII vid 21.02.2014, VVR, 2014, No. 11, st. 143; No. 1401-VIII vid 02.06.2016, 
VVR, 2016, No. 28, st. 532], http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-
%D0%B2%D1%80, Nov. 6, 2017.
6 Cf.: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid 25 lyutoho 2017 roku No. 47/2017 Pro	
Doktrynu	 informatsiynoyi	 bezpeky	 U	 Ukrayiny, http://www.president.gov.ua/docu-
ments/472017-21374, Nov. 6, 2017.
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also concentrated on indicating the most important threats, in the form of 
information expansion or special information operations aimed at radi-
calization of moods, or opinions of an indicated enemy.
It should be emphasized that the solutions adopted in the strategic 
document quoted encompass both the issues concerning civil rights stem-
ming from the democratic nature of the Ukrainian constitutional regime 
and proposals for practical solutions. However, these are not proposals 
on an operational level, which stems from the methodology and doctrinal 
nature of the document. It should rather be treated in terms of a strategy 
for the political and public communications of the Ukrainian authorities. 
The doctrine in question describes, among other things, the necessity of 
conducting cultural diplomacy in order to shape the international image 
of Ukraine, implementing e-administration solutions and popularizing 
access to public information, TV digitalization, development of local 
communication, and public debate. The fight against misinformation and 
destructive propaganda is to take the shape of strategic narration, under-
stood as a specially prepared text for verbal dissemination in the process 
of strategic communication in order to influence the target group in terms 
of information.7
Thus, taking into account the content of the Information	Security	Doc-
trine	 of	Ukraine, it can be stated that the document should be in fact 
treated as a concept for the strategic communication of the state. The 
solutions proposed in it are quite general, which is typical of such docu-
ments, setting out the directions of activities and the substantive scope of 
undertakings.
The document which sets out the ways of implementing the doctrine 
is the Concept	for	the	promotion	of	Ukraine	in	the	world	and	its	interests	
in	 the	 global	 information	 space. The aim of the solutions proposed in 
this document is the protection of the political and economic interests of 
Ukraine and their popularization in the global information space.8 The 
main aspects that should be emphasized include, for example, increased 
presence of Ukraine in international events, engaging the diaspora, or call-
ing on non-governmental institutions for the implementation of projects, 
e.g. concerning cultural diplomacy. The result of the implementation of 
the concept on the basis of annual action plans is to be the enhancement 
7 Ibid.
8 Pozporyadzhennya Kabinet Ministriv Ukrayiny Pro	skhvalennya	Kontseptsiyi	
populyaryzatsiyi	Ukrayiny	u	sviti	ta	prosuvannya	interesiv	Ukrayiny	u	svitovomu	in-
formatsiynomu	prostori vid 11 zhovtnya 2016 r. No. 739-r.
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of the image of Ukraine as a reliable partner in the international arena and 
the increasing attractiveness of the country for tourism and investment.
Institutional dimension
Analyzing the institutional aspect, we should first of all mention the 
Committee of the Supreme Council on Freedom of Speech and Informa-
tion Policy.9 As regards freedom of speech, we can point to the National 
Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting (Ukrainian: Національна	
рада	України	з	питань	телебачення	і	радіомовлення), which is a con-
stitutional body. On the other hand, the State Committee for Television 
and Radio Broadcasting is a central body of executive power which is 
subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers, being at the same time the found-
ing and coordinating body for Ukrainian public media.10 However, due 
to the thematic scope of this article, attention will only be focused on the 
institutionalization of information policy in the strict sense.
However, Ukrainian information policy is implemented mainly by the 
Ministry of Information Policy which functions under the resolution of 
the Supreme Council of Ukraine and the regulation of the Cabinet of Min-
isters.11 Tasks allocated to the Ministry of Information Policy have been 
placed within the scope of information policy treated from the wider defi-
nitional perspective. This concerns, among other things, the organization 
of cultural events (which can be treated as a manifestation of public diplo-
macy), as well as the popularization of Ukrainian TV programs abroad, 
or disseminating information about Ukraine in the world, and even the 
protection of state secrets and classified information. Other aspects of the 
activities of the Ministry of Information Policy are connected with the 
implementation of European standards concerning guarantees of freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press, understood as the so-called fourth 
estate. The ministry also tackles public communication, development of 
access to public information and enhancing transparency in the function-
9 http://komsvobslova.rada.gov.ua/, Nov. 16, 2017.
10 Polozhennya pro Derzhavnyy	komitet	telebachennya	i	radiomovlennya	Ukray-
iny zatverdzhene postanovoyu KMU vid 13.08.2014 No. 341.
11 Postanova Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayiny “Pro	 formuvannya	 skladu	Kabinetu	
Ministriv	Ukrayiny” (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady (VVR), 2014, No. 52, st. 2062); 
Polozhennya pro Ministerstvo informatsiynoyi polityky Ukrayiny, zatverdzheno post-
anovoyu Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrayiny vid 14 sichnya 2015 р. No. 2. 
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ing of the administration. However, this mostly concerns the effective 
information war connected with the armed conflict in some areas of the 
eastern Ukrainian oblasts.12 This conflict is described by the Ukrainian 
state authorities as a counter-terrorism operation, and it is accordingly 
described in legal regulations, which in the axiological aspect unambigu-
ously defines this issue from the communicational perspective.
The aims of the Ministry can be dychotomically divided into strategic 
and tactical priorities. They are both coherent with each other. An exam-
ple of this is the strategic priority of the transparency of administrative 
activities, which significantly limits corruption. The objective of the as-
sumed counter-propaganda, on the other hand, is to gain an information 
advantage, and as a consequence to succeed in the information war being 
fought in the occupied and liberated territories (i.e. Crimea and parts of 
the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts).
However, it should be emphasized that the Ministry of Information 
Policy does not position itself as a propagandist or controlling institution, 
or as a body responsible for the political communication of the image of 
major state bodies. The Ministry declares that it is not responsible for 
information and psychological operations.13
From the point of view of the issues tackled in this article, the Ukrain-
ian Information Agency UkrInform and UATV (Ukraine Tomorrow) are 
other key institutions for effective information policy. The activity of both 
is legitimated under the special act on the international broadcasting sys-
tem.14 This act constitutes the functioning of the state broadcasting system 
of Ukraine, comprising the state-owned enterprise Multimedia Broadcast-
ing Platform of Ukraine and the information agency UkrInform.
The publicly accessible agency website offers content in a few lan-
guage versions. They ensure social reach for the strategic narration. 
Thus UATV, which has been broadcasting since October 2015, broad-
casts in five language versions, including the language of the Crimean 
Tatars. Coverage in languages other than English cannot exceed half of 
the transmission time. This is connected with the international nature of 
the strategic narration broadcast on UATV. Besides being accessible on 
cable networks worldwide, UATV provides Internet streaming and the 
programs are also available on social and content media. However, the 
12 http://mip.gov.ua/files/Presentation/en_pres.pdf, Nov. 19, 2017.
13 http://mip.gov.ua/files/documents/MIP_activity_2016_eng.pdf, Nov. 19, 2017.
14 Zakon Ukrayiny Pro	systemu	inomovlennya	Ukrayiny (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi 
Rady (VVR), 2016, No. 4, st. 37).
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program content of UATV does not contain a current news service. It is a 
TV channel whose target group is the audience abroad, informing about 
events in Ukraine and the activities of state bodies. The mission of UATV 
is creating a positive image of Ukraine in the international community, 
as well as promoting intercultural and international communication and 
creating a public discourse about the official stance of state and local au-
thorities on important issues of politics, culture, sport and education, as 
well as science. The task of the TV channel is also information support 
for the process of the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and 
Euro-Atlantic structures, popularizing Ukrainian culture in the world and 
the promotion of Ukraine’s investment attractiveness.15
Thus, considering the mission and tasks of Ukraine Tomorrow, it should 
be indicated that it is first and foremost a narrative propagandist medium 
aimed at the aggressive distribution of Ukrainian strategic narration.
However, it should be emphasized that the concept of synergy in the 
information policy implemented through the state-owned enterprise, the 
Multimedia Broadcasting Platform of Ukraine, and the state information 
agency UkrInform is still at an initial stage of implementation and the as-
sessment of its effectiveness requires deeper research into the perception 
of news content.
Table 1
Popularity of the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine’s profiles 
 on social and content websites
Likes Followers Subscriptions Views
Facebook 4,273 4,424
Twitter 5,339
Youtube 1,116 570,576
Google+ 32
Source: Own elaboration, as of Nov 23, 2017.
Analyzing the popularity of the UATV and UkrInform profiles on so-
cial and content websites, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, video 
content is the most popular element in both institutions, considering the 
number of views. However, a more meaningful indicator is the number 
of subscriptions, which reflects the number of people following a giv-
en profile. Subscribing and following may be treated as a manifestation 
15 Zakon Ukrayiny Pro	systemu	inomovlennya	Ukrayiny (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi 
Rady (VVR), 2016, No. 4, st. 37), ctattya 6.
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of preferences, while views or likes may be incidental and reflect only 
the temporary interest of users. However, in the case of video content 
from UATV and UkrInform, the popularity of subscriptions mainly in the 
Ukrainian language version can be noticed, followed by the Russian and 
Arabic versions. The last two indications may be explained by the natural 
interest of Russian speaking people, both ethnic Russians and Ukrainians 
using Russian on an everyday basis. The interest in Arabic versions stems 
from the nature of the bonds between Muslims. The territory of Crimea 
annexed by the Russian Federation is inhabited by a considerable group 
of Tatars, who share religion with the Arab community.16 The popularity 
of the Ukrainian language version as regards profiles on Facebook and 
Twitter may demonstrate the tendency to awaken Ukrainians’ national 
consciousness. The informational and political conflict with Russia has 
become a catalyst for the consolidation of Ukrainian national conscious-
ness which, in combination with the propagandist narrative of the UATV 
television channel, influences the rising sense of belonging and national 
pride. The analysis of UATV information content may indicate that this 
channel practices white propaganda – which is external and in this case 
serves the information and interpretative function used to build a persua-
sive message (Piechota, Rajczyk, 2016, pp. 234–235).
To sum up the institutional aspect of information policy of Ukraine, it 
should first of all be emphasized that the content on new media is not very 
popular. This may be explained by the brief period of the UATV channel’s 
functioning, the lack of its own website and poor positioning of the do-
main address on the Internet. Moreover, the language versions of profiles 
on social and content media are not the same. In the case of Instagram 
and Youtube, the Ukrainian language version prevails. The domination of 
the Ukrainian language version is incompatible with the simultaneously 
addressing the message to the foreign audience as regards the objectives. 
Adding other language versions on profiles offered on social and content 
media will thus be necessary. An important communication synergy effect 
must also be noted. UATV does not broadcast the latest news bulletins, 
but instead concentrates on the informative-interpretative function, nev-
ertheless retaining elements of news broadcast live in the form of news 
bars in Ukrainian and English. However, the informative function domi-
nates in the activities of UkrInform.
16 According to data from the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, the Tatar 
community in Ukraine including Crimea, is estimated at about 350,000 people.
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Operational dimension
The campaigns carried out by the Ministry of Information Policy 
can be divided into categories determined by their type: social, infor-
mational and persuasive. The category of social campaigns concerns 
the activities that are aimed at explaining social policy initiatives to the 
citizens of Ukraine (aid for internal resettlers, access to social aid) and 
the necessity of changes in the fees for municipal services. Although the 
decision about increased fees caused social protests, from the narrative 
side it has been presented as a fight for Ukraine’s energy independ-
ence.17 Information campaigns, on the other hand, are concentrated on 
implementing the integrative function, and they concern, among other 
things, the promotion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, state holiday 
celebrations, interethnic integration,18 as well as popularizing learning 
foreign languages or promoting structural reforms, such as the decen-
tralization of the state.19
Finally, the persuasive campaigns mainly encompass issues connect-
ed with the counter-terrorism operations carried out in the eastern re-
gions of Ukraine and in Crimea annexed by the Russian Federation. An 
example of this is the project Ukraine’s	information	army (http://i-army.
org) aimed at fighting anti-Ukrainian propaganda by creating a com-
munity using so-called swarm technology.20 However, with regard to 
Crimea, the persuasive campaigns conducted are aimed at the integra-
tion of the Tatar community or support for the reintegration of Crimea 
with Ukraine.21
The operational aspect of Ukrainian information policy is thus char-
acterized by a diversity of forms and content and the use of modern com-
munication techniques also based on new media, but social campaigns are 
first of all highly utilitarian.22 Both social campaigns, and information or 
persuasive campaigns are a response to the real needs of citizens and the 
17 http://mip.gov.ua/content/energetichna-efektivnist.html, Nov. 26, 2017.
18 This concerns the campaign: Three	nations,	one	root presenting Ukraine’s eth-
nic diversity – see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSxfoW__f-A&feature=youtu.
be, Nov. 26, 2017.
19 http://mip.gov.ua/en/news/1975.html, Nov. 26, 2017.
20 The project’s Youtube profile has over 1.5 million views and over 6,500 sub-
scriptions, 29,900 followers on Twitter, 43,705 followers and 43,740 likes on Face-
book, 1,308 on Google+ and 7,826 followers on VKontakte.
21 http://mip.gov.ua/en/news/285.html, Nov. 26, 2017.
22 http://mip.gov.ua/en/content/uryadovi-proekti.html, Nov. 26, 2017.
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problems that Ukraine is encountering while introducing systemic and 
structural reforms.
On the other hand, analyzing the popularity of the profiles of the Min-
istry of Information Policy on social and content networks, it should be 
indicated that the Ministry itself, with its corporate message, is less popu-
lar than its projects intensively communicated and promoted on social 
media. This is evidence of a high degree of communication effectiveness 
of the projects, which is the result of the professionalization of the Min-
istry’s staff.
Conclusion
The above analysis of Ukrainian information policy confirmed the 
main research hypothesis of this article, and also its secondary nature to 
strategic communication, mainly due to the fact that information policy 
does not encompass the current information activities of the Ukrainian 
government. The factors determining Ukrainian information policy can 
be divided into economic, social or political. In the first group, the need 
to increase the attractiveness of the state for investment and tourism 
should be taken into consideration. In the second group, national and 
social integration and, as regards political factors, information policy is 
mainly shaped by the geopolitical situation of Ukraine. This undoubt-
edly means the correlation between information policy and strategic 
communication of the country. Information policy is thus, in fact, one 
of the tools used in Ukrainian strategic communication. An important 
novelty is including information policy as part of the information secu-
rity of a country, which is understood as the protection of information 
space from foreign propaganda influence. Educational campaigns fight 
with misinformation and enemy propaganda, which take place in the 
process of fake news transmission. The methodological approach to the 
issue of information policy on the part of its managers is also worth 
emphasizing. The constitutional approach to this issue in connection 
with the strategic aspect – the Information	Security	Doctrine – and the 
operational aspect – the Concept	of	promotion	of	Ukraine	in	the	world	
and	its	interests	in	the	global	information	space – makes it possible to 
conclude that Ukrainian information policy is entering an institutionali-
zation and professionalization phase, which will undoubtedly influence 
the level of its effectiveness.
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Instytucjonalizacja ukraińskiej polityki informacyjnej,  
jako funkcja komunikacji strategicznej 
 
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest analiza ukraińskiej polityki informacyjnej. W badaniu uwa-
gę skoncentrowano na władzy wykonawczej ze względu na fakt, że to egzekutywa 
w znaczący sposób wpływa na wizerunek wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny państwa ukraiń-
skiego. Analizę przeprowadzono w ujęciu ilościowym, podczas którego namysłowi 
naukowemu poddano nadawane treści. Ocenie naukowej poddano także efektywność 
strukturalną realizowanej polityki informacyjnej oraz jej aspekt utylitarny.
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